[10892] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: E-voting paper analyzes "usability" problems of current systems
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Matthew Byng-Maddick)
Wed Jun 19 18:14:19 2002
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 22:46:26 +0100
From: Matthew Byng-Maddick <cryptography@lists.colondot.net>
To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: <4DDCE8648ECDD11187910060979C535803F81D91@lsumcbolivar.lsuhsc.edu>; from Jdean@lsuhsc.edu on Wed, Jun 19, 2002 at 07:13:17AM -0500
Mail-Copies-To: never
On Wed, Jun 19, 2002 at 07:13:17AM -0500, Dean, James wrote:
> > Forwarded below is an email from Dr. Rebecca Mercuri whose
> > PhD dissertation contained a proof that an electronic voting
> > system can be either secure (tamper proof) or anonymous
> > (as in secret ballot), but NOT BOTH
> What part of the proof fails for non-electronic voting?
I don't know how you do it in the US, but in the UK, votes are not strictly
anonymous. It is a question of who has access to which paper trails that
make it "effectively" anonymous. I suspect, then, that this proof can
extend to paper-based voting in exactly the same way.
MBM
--
Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@colondot.net> http://colondot.net/
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