[10893] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: E-voting paper analyzes "usability" problems of current syste ms
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Matt Blaze)
Wed Jun 19 19:48:21 2002
To: "Dean, James" <Jdean@lsuhsc.edu>
Cc: "'R. A. Hettinga'" <rah@shipwright.com>,
Digital Bearer Settlement List <dbs@philodox.com>,
cryptography@wasabisystems.com
In-Reply-To: Message from "Dean, James" <Jdean@lsuhsc.edu>
of "Wed, 19 Jun 2002 07:13:17 CDT." <4DDCE8648ECDD11187910060979C535803F81D91@lsumcbolivar.lsuhsc.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 17:55:23 -0400
From: Matt Blaze <mab@research.att.com>
> > Forwarded below is an email from Dr. Rebecca Mercuri whose
> > PhD dissertation contained a proof that an electronic voting
> > system can be either secure (tamper proof) or anonymous
> > (as in secret ballot), but NOT BOTH
>
> What part of the proof fails for non-electronic voting?
>
Paper ballots aren't "secure" in most senses of the term as we'd
apply it to electronic voting - they can be tampered with, etc. and
there's no way for the voter to even tell. In a paper system,
the tallying mechanism is a "trusted" component (another example
of where the technical term "trusted" refers an undesirable property
of a system, even though the colloquial use of the word usually
describes something good).
-matt
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