[1381] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: distributed virtual bank

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Fri Aug 29 11:49:58 1997

Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 17:10:17 -0700 (PDT)
To: tzeruch@ceddec.com, Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net

At 12:35 PM 8/27/97 -0400, tzeruch@ceddec.com wrote:
> The only problem I see is that once one node has the n of k in the simple
> protocols, they have the secret.  You need *distributed* N of K secret
> splitting such that for whatever function (e.g. signing blinded coins,
> processing electronic cheques) the Nth node can accomplish the function
> without being able to reconstruct the secret.  There are anti-cheating
> protocols too, but I haven't researched them.

Schneier's protocols for voting all involved a trusted central authority,
which is a pain,because the central authority is usually the one you
have least reason to trust.

There are theoretical reasons to believe a protocol is possible that
does not require a trusted central authority, but I have not seen
it yet.

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