[1382] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: distributed virtual bank
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com)
Fri Aug 29 13:11:51 1997
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 1997 11:17:27 -0400
From: nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com
To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
cc: tzeruch@ceddec.com, cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <199708290010.RAA28322@proxy4.ba.best.com>
On Thu, 28 Aug 1997, James A. Donald wrote:
> Schneier's protocols for voting all involved a trusted central authority,
> which is a pain,because the central authority is usually the one you
> have least reason to trust.
>
> There are theoretical reasons to believe a protocol is possible that
> does not require a trusted central authority, but I have not seen
> it yet.
Generally any of the digital cash protocols would work. I get a token
from the government which I can send (like exchanging a "spent" for a new
coin) to validate the tokens. The government won't know if I am a
republican or democrat. On voting day, I send my "coin" to the party HQ
of my choice. The tokens are easily proved valid or invalid, only a
finite number are issued (one to each voter), they can't be forged, and
the Republicans, Democrats, Libertarians, etc. merely act as collection
agencies and count them (and they can't forge the votes either, nor
identify who they came from). The votes could then be published by each
party HQ (although the list would be huge), but there could be no
cheating.
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