[147078] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post

Re: [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Guido Witmond)
Fri Sep 13 11:41:59 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2013 23:32:29 +0200
From: Guido Witmond <guido@witmond.nl>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAHOTMVKFKiR3ryEkObja934xq2MHjSOnxzFp4ra=ts6=GVExgQ@mail.gmail.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
--===============4916189837825220494==
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
 protocol="application/pgp-signature";
 boundary="----enig2GPMJEHJCSATXGFLNUBXJ"

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
------enig2GPMJEHJCSATXGFLNUBXJ
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On 09/12/13 18:33, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 8:00 PM, John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com
> <mailto:gnu@toad.com>> wrote:
>=20
>     There doesn't seem to be much downside to just calling it "Forward
>     Secrecy" rather than "Perfect Forward Secrecy".  We all seem to agr=
ee
>     that it isn't perfect, and that it is a step forward in security, a=
t a
>     moderate cost in latency and performance.
>=20
>=20
> What's really bothered me about the phrase "perfect forward secrecy" is=

> it's being applied to public key algorithms we know will be broken as
> soon as a large quantum computer has been built (in e.g. a decade or
> two). Meanwhile people seem to think that it's some sort of technique
> that will render messages unbreakable forever.

Perhaps of (little) comfort:

By the time that quantum computer has been built, it will become clear
that by breaking the PFS crypto, you also break the non-repudiation.

In other words: No one can claim in a (decent) court that a certain
message has been sent by you, when the quantum computer can break both
the PFS and the merkle-tree hashes that are supposed to prove the
authenticity.

In the mean time, remember Scott Mc Nealy: "Privacy online is dead."

Guido.


------enig2GPMJEHJCSATXGFLNUBXJ
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove - http://www.enigmail.net/
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=BW+I
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

------enig2GPMJEHJCSATXGFLNUBXJ--

--===============4916189837825220494==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

_______________________________________________
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@metzdowd.com
http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
--===============4916189837825220494==--

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post