[147227] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Frantz)
Wed Sep 18 17:26:09 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 13:58:22 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwjfPuj=P3D2SEpJdCgSSnsfKmQpYhDkT+PW15bEvmegTw@mail.gmail.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 9/18/13 at 6:08 AM, hallam@gmail.com (Phillip Hallam-Baker) wrote:
>If I am trying to work out if an email was really sent by my bank then I
>want a CA type security model because less than 0.1% of customers are ever
>going to understand a PGP type web of trust for that particular purpose.
>But its the bank sending the mail, not an individual at the bank.
I know I would be a lot more comfortable with a way to check the
mail against a piece of paper I received directly from my bank
(the PGP model). I would have no problem in entering a magic
authentication string (the key fingerprint) into my mail agent
to authenticate my bank. The security of my money is of more
that trivial importance.
Second would be having my mail agent tell me that the mail came
from the same place as the previous piece of email I received
(the SSH model). This model would work for most of my friends
where MitM is unlikely. In the cases where MitM worries became
important, I could then check fingerprints.
The CA model lets a powerful attacker subvert the CA at any time
ignoring both out of band and same-as-the-last-time
authentications. I'm OK with CAs for credit card transactions.
There's a $50 limit on my risk from fraud.
Cheers - Bill
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