[147236] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Robin Alden)
Thu Sep 19 13:03:35 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: "Robin Alden" <robin.alden@comodogroup.com>
To: <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20130918215031.GZ29796@mournblade.imrryr.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 20:03:44 -0400
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:47:17PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
> > > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
> > > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
> > > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
> > >
> > > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
> >
> > X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
> > don't work.
Which is why the CAB Forum and Mozilla made the pragmatic move to promote
the use of X.509 name constraints as a non-critical extension.
>
> And public CAs don't generally sell intermediate CAs with name
constraints.
> Rather undercuts their business model.
>
Public CAs are starting to offer name-constrained intermediate CAs to
suitable customers.
Why wouldn't we? - It doesn't undercut our business model any more than
selling a wildcard certificate.
> --
> Viktor.
Robin Alden
Comodo
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