[147238] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Thu Sep 19 13:05:15 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 21:52:08 +1200
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: hallam@gmail.com, perry@piermont.com
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+LwjfPuj=P3D2SEpJdCgSSnsfKmQpYhDkT+PW15bEvmegTw@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: huitema@huitema.net, cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> writes:
>I have not spent a great deal of time looking at the exact capabilities of
>PRISM vs the other programs involved because from a design point they are
>irrelevant. The objective is to harden/protect the infrastructure from any
>ubiquitous, indiscriminate intercept capability like the one Gen Alexander
>appears to have constructed.
Precisely. I made the same point recently in an interview about PRISM, that a
well-designed, well-engineered protocol will be NSA-proof (or at least as NSA-
proof as you can get within reason). It'll also be Russian mafia-proof,
Chinese-government-proof, and your-mother-proof. There isn't some exotic
class of protocol or mechanism that's needed to resist the NSA, anything well-
designed and implemented can do it.
Peter.
_______________________________________________
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@metzdowd.com
http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
