[147291] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (ianG)
Wed Sep 25 18:22:43 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 19:17:27 +0300
From: ianG <iang@iang.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <5241BC78.7030104@kjro.se>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 24/09/13 19:23 PM, Kelly John Rose wrote:
> I have always approached that no encryption is better than bad
> encryption, otherwise the end user will feel more secure than they
> should and is more likely to share information or data they should not
> be on that line.
The trap of a false sense of security is far outweighed by the benefit
of a "good enough" security delivered to more people.
We're talking multiple orders of magnitude here. The math that counts is:
Security = Users * Protection.
iang
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