[147599] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Salz, Rich)
Thu Oct 10 16:56:11 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "ray@unipay.nl" <ray@unipay.nl>, "cryptography@metzdowd.com"
<cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:03:33 -0400
In-Reply-To: <201310101558.r9AFwZoL003676@home.unipay.nl>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
> The simple(-minded) idea is that everybody receives everybody's email, but can only read their own. Since everybody gets everything, the metadata is uninteresting and traffic analysis is largely fruitless.
Some traffic analysis is still possible based on just message originator. If I see a message from A, and then soon see messages from B and C, then I can perhaps assume they are collaborating. If I A's message is significantly larger then the other two, then perhaps they're taking some kind of vote.
So while it's a neat hack, I think the claims are overstated.
/r$
--
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technology
Cambridge, MA
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