[148387] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Anonymous messaging [was: Email is securable
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (StealthMonger)
Sat Dec 7 22:01:39 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.mixmin.net>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52A30032.5040905@tesco.net> (Ron Leach's message of "Sat, 07 Dec
2013 11:02:10 +0000")
Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2013 02:25:17 +0000 (GMT)
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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Ron Leach <ronleach@tesco.net> writes:
> Yes, the CHAIN might ensure his anonymity at point of posting to the
> newsgroup, but disclosure will have occurred at point of first entry
> to the chain (and, potentially, subsequently for any honeypots
> following in the chain until the first genuine remailer).
But disclosure of what exactly? That he is using the remailer network,
yes. But the tail of the chain disconnects from any particular message
emerging from the exit (or none, if he uses mixmaster "dummy" feature).
The adversary is further confused if Bob is injecting a dummy message
anyway every few hours, and simply substitutes his live message for one
of the dummies which would have gone.
> It's the same problem with TOR, isn't it? The first TOR server knows=20
> who is accessing the network.
Yes, but TOR is connection-based and deliberately low-latency, so
anonymity is not possible anyway [1,2]. (NSA-planted reflexive TOR
defenders, there's your cue.) The remailer network is message-based and
deliberately high-latency.
> Anonymity of *access* is becoming desirable, I think. But is it=20
> attainable?
That would be nice. Ideas?
[1]
... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
quickly linking the initiator to her destination.
http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf
[2]
... Tor offers basically no protection against somebody who can
measure [2] flows at both sides of the circuit ...
--- Tor developer Roger Dingledine
http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech%40lists.stanford.edu/msg00022.ht=
ml
=2D-=20
-- StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.mixmin.net>
Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity.
anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what?
http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df=
33?dmode=3Dsource&output=3Dgplain
stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom.
mailto:stealthsuite@nym.mixmin.net?subject=3Dsend%20index.html
Key: mailto:stealthsuite@nym.mixmin.net?subject=3Dsend%20stealthmonger-key
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