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Re: [Cryptography] Anonymous messaging [was: Email is securable

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ron Leach)
Sat Dec 7 16:13:24 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 07 Dec 2013 11:02:10 +0000
From: Ron Leach <ronleach@tesco.net>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20131207052450.A04EFEAC31@snorky.mixmin.net>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

On 07/12/2013 05:24, StealthMonger wrote:
> "Bob Simmons"<bsimmons@compassnet.com>  writes:
>> Of course, if I were to use this for real, I would have to be sure
>> dizum.com isn't a honeypot.
>
> Hence the virtue of using CHAINS of remailers, so that if even just one
> of them is good, your anonymity is secure.  (And the step after that is
> to operate a remailer yourself so you KNOW one of them is good.)
>

Are we sure?  I read Bob's post as being wary in case the *first* 
remailer, dizum.com in his case, which receives his connection and 
therefore has some idea who he is, were to be a honeypot.  Yes, the 
CHAIN might ensure his anonymity at point of posting to the newsgroup, 
but disclosure will have occurred at point of first entry to the chain 
(and, potentially, subsequently for any honeypots following in the 
chain until the first genuine remailer).

It's the same problem with TOR, isn't it?  The first TOR server knows 
who is accessing the network.

Anonymity of *access* is becoming desirable, I think.  But is it 
attainable?

regards, Ron
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