[148395] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: [Cryptography] Anonymous messaging

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (StealthMonger)
Mon Dec 9 16:37:33 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.mixmin.net>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52A4D5DA.3000602@tesco.net> (Ron Leach's message of "Sun, 08 Dec
	2013 20:26:02 +0000")
Date: Mon,  9 Dec 2013 21:00:51 +0000 (GMT)
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

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Ron Leach <ronleach@tesco.net> writes:

> On 08/12/2013 02:25, StealthMonger wrote:

>> TOR is connection-based and deliberately low-latency, so anonymity is
>> not possible anyway [1,2].  (NSA-planted reflexive TOR defenders,
>> there's your cue.)

> Thank you for posting the citations.

There's also the important [3] which I forgot.


[1]
   ... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
   correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
   both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
   quickly linking the initiator to her destination.

http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf

[2]
   ... Tor offers basically no protection against somebody who can
   measure [2] flows at both sides of the circuit ...
     --- Tor developer Roger Dingledine

http://www.mail-archive.com/liberationtech%40lists.stanford.edu/msg00022.ht=
ml

[3] "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic
    Adversaries", Aaron Johnson, Chris Wacek, Rob Jansen, Micah Sherr,
    Paul Syverson, 2013

   ABSTRACT ... Our results show that Tor users are far more susceptible
   to compromise than indicated by prior work. ...

http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf


=2D-=20


 -- StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.mixmin.net>
    Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity.

   anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what?
   http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df=
33?dmode=3Dsource&output=3Dgplain

   stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom.
   mailto:stealthsuite@nym.mixmin.net?subject=3Dsend%20index.html


Key: mailto:stealthsuite@nym.mixmin.net?subject=3Dsend%20stealthmonger-key


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