[148656] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (ianG)
Tue Dec 24 13:05:43 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 10:43:34 +0300
From: ianG <iang@iang.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <5404D885-52DF-4D6A-A248-7E2F3E82BE3D@lrw.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 23/12/13 19:20 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> ... And everyone is trying to reverse-engineer everyone else's designs. All the underpinnings are there. And various parts of the US military and security establishment are quite aware - have, in fact, talked publicly about - the problem of "spiked" chips making it into their supply chains.
Aha. So, are there any case studies of this actually happening? This
might shed light on the RDRAND question. If we had a documented case of
(say) the Chinese slipping spiked chips in to one of the hot USAF toys,
then we'd have some sense of how likely this is.
>> Then what?
> Yet another arms race.
Papers, conferences, budgets, hype, FUD, gosh.
iang
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