[149025] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Dual_EC_DRBG backdoor: a proof of concept
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Mon Jan 13 21:25:20 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 07:12:25 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52D3B34C.1040802@iang.org>
Reply-To: jamesd@echeque.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 2014-01-13 19:35, ianG wrote:
> This is a useful thing, as it also has consequences. It protects the
> NSA from blundering again -- if they know we all act "as if" the NSA is
> going to pervert the NIST standards, then they are much less likely to
> do it.
Back in the seventies, every communist faction was infiltrating every
other faction, including every other communist faction. Every communist
faction was on the alert, and willing to use all means including murder
and torture to prevent infiltration, and yet the problem was not remedied.
If the NSA targets committees, they are likely to succeed, even if
members of the committee are on the alert
Hence I recommend unelected presidents for life, and God Kings.
If everyone decides to follow one man, that man's preferred algorithms
will be adequately examined.
Let us follow Jon Callas as unelected president for life of symmetric
cryptography, Daniel Bernstein as God King of asymmetric cryptography.
Committees barely work even when not under hostile infiltration.
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