[23985] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: PGP "master keys"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Thu Apr 27 10:39:47 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 22:41:12 -0400
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20060426222422.sidua993cso4oo4k@webmail.mit.edu>
On Wed, 26 Apr 2006 22:24:22 -0400, Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU> wrote:
> Quoting "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>:
>
> > In an article on disk encryption
> > (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
> > paragraph appears:
> >
> > BitLocker has landed Redmond in some hot water over its insistence
> > that there are no back doors for law enforcement. As its
> > encryption code is open source, PGP says it can guarantee no back
> > doors, but that cyber sleuths can use its master keys if
> > neccessary.
> >
> > What is a "master key" in this context?
>
> ADK, the Additional Decryption Key. An enterprise with a Managed
> PGP Desktop installed base can set up an ADK and all messages get
> encrypted to the ADK in addition to the recipient's key.
>
Ah -- corporate key escrow. An overt back door for Little Brother, rather
than a covert one for Big Brother....
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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