[3492] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: IP: State Govt Will Use Datakey Smart Cards
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Fri Oct 16 13:59:08 1998
In-Reply-To: <kjaf2xbxj7.fsf@speedy.rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 15:29:44 +0100
To: EKR <ekr@rtfm.com>
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Cc: "Enzo Michelangeli" <em@who.net>, <cryptography@c2.net>
At 9:27 AM -0700 10/15/98, EKR [Eric Rescorla ekr@rtfm.com] wrote:
>"Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com> writes:
. . .
>
>> I am not saying bootstrapping trust is easy, but I believe that it is
>> possible and that it is very important work.
>To be blunt, I believe it's next to a complete waste of time.
>We've got an enormous number of security problems right now
>that we know how to solve in a pretty good way. Those solutions
>aren't perfect, but they're a hell of a lot better than what
>we've got now. But deployment of those solutions keeps getting
>bogged down because people want to make them perfect. (Those
>of you on this mailing list who have been part of the IPSEC
>effort will be sensitive to this issue).
>
>I consider the probability of an attack along the lines we're
>discussing to be vanishingly small. By contrast, we know that the
>systems we use are riddled with unintentional holes that get exploited
>all the time. Our effort would be better spent fixing those holes.
>
Early in my career I attended a very boring lecture on numerical issues in
matrix manipualtion. Someone in the audience asked the speaker why he spent
so much of his time on such a narrow problem. He responded that he worked
for Boeing developing design software and had nightmares about wings
falling off. Since then I have sat through innumerable design reviews
wishing every young engineer came with an "off" switch. More than once I
have been glad they didn't.
I haven't been following IPSEC . Maybe things have gotten bogged down
unnecessarily, maybe real concerns still need to be aired. Consensus
building is tough. I do believe that there is a lot more at stake than
protecting electronic commerce and keeping hackers out of the New York
Times web site. How well the security infrastructure being desiged now
really works could dramatically affect what the world is like in 50 years.
In any case, as I understand it, this is a research list and problems like
smart card trust are worth airing, even if they are not at the top of the
priority list.
We are down to philosophy at this point and it is time for me to stop. You
are welcome to the last word.
>The phrase "the good is the enemy of the best" ccmes to mind.
>
I like "measure twice, cut once."
Arnold Reinhold
