[757] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Carl Ellison)
Thu May 8 13:59:15 1997
Date: Thu, 08 May 1997 12:00:22 -0400
To: Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>
From: Carl Ellison <cme@cybercash.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net, mab@research.att.com
In-Reply-To: <19970507225925.26689@bywater.songbird.com>
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At 10:59 PM 5/7/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>There is always the question of how much security is enough. Key
>recovery systems can be made as secure as necessary.
As the designer/implementor of one such system, I can assure you that the
security of the key recovery "safe" can be increased as far as you desire --
but you can't do anything about the insecurity introduced by having lost
control over your crypto recipients. You, the owner and creator of the data
in question, should specify precisely who can be a crypto-recipient.
With a KR box like the one I designed and built, you had that control -- but
there was a "corporate override" built in. The organization having physical
ownership of this box had global rights to its data -- through disassembly,
if necessary -- a path the gov't hopes to exploit, BTW.
Having the data owner list specific crypto recipients avoids that global access.
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|Carl M. Ellison cme@cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
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