[148382] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Anonymous messaging [was: Email is securable
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Sat Dec 7 16:50:48 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52A30032.5040905@tesco.net>
Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2013 21:26:41 +0000
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
To: Ron Leach <ronleach@tesco.net>
Cc: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 7 December 2013 11:02, Ron Leach <ronleach@tesco.net> wrote:
> On 07/12/2013 05:24, StealthMonger wrote:
>>
>> "Bob Simmons"<bsimmons@compassnet.com> writes:
>>>
>>> Of course, if I were to use this for real, I would have to be sure
>>> dizum.com isn't a honeypot.
>>
>>
>> Hence the virtue of using CHAINS of remailers, so that if even just one
>> of them is good, your anonymity is secure. (And the step after that is
>> to operate a remailer yourself so you KNOW one of them is good.)
>>
>
> Are we sure? I read Bob's post as being wary in case the *first* remailer,
> dizum.com in his case, which receives his connection and therefore has some
> idea who he is, were to be a honeypot. Yes, the CHAIN might ensure his
> anonymity at point of posting to the newsgroup, but disclosure will have
> occurred at point of first entry to the chain (and, potentially,
> subsequently for any honeypots following in the chain until the first
> genuine remailer).
>
> It's the same problem with TOR, isn't it? The first TOR server knows who is
> accessing the network.
>
> Anonymity of *access* is becoming desirable, I think. But is it attainable?
You mean anonymity of using TOR is becoming desirable, surely? Because
everyone is accessing the network.
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