[148690] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Cox)
Tue Dec 24 23:06:51 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <52B93B26.8020403@iang.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 21:00:06 -0500
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@gmail.com>
To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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It's not publically documented, but I hear TSMC added extra transistors to
some Xilinx FPGAs, and the last I heard, no one had figured out what they
were for.
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 2:43 AM, ianG <iang@iang.org> wrote:
> On 23/12/13 19:20 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
>
> ... And everyone is trying to reverse-engineer everyone else's designs.
>> All the underpinnings are there. And various parts of the US military and
>> security establishment are quite aware - have, in fact, talked publicly
>> about - the problem of "spiked" chips making it into their supply chains.
>>
>
>
> Aha. So, are there any case studies of this actually happening? This
> might shed light on the RDRAND question. If we had a documented case of
> (say) the Chinese slipping spiked chips in to one of the hot USAF toys,
> then we'd have some sense of how likely this is.
>
>
> Then what?
>>>
>> Yet another arms race.
>>
>
>
> Papers, conferences, budgets, hype, FUD, gosh.
>
>
> iang
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">It's not publically documented, but I hear TSMC added =
extra transistors to some Xilinx FPGAs, and the last I heard, no one had fi=
gured out what they were for.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 2:43 AM, ianG <span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mail=
to:iang@iang.org" target=3D"_blank">iang@iang.org</a>></span> wrote:<br>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 23/12/13 19:20 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
... =A0And everyone is trying to reverse-engineer everyone else's desig=
ns. =A0All the underpinnings are there. =A0And various parts of the US mili=
tary and security establishment are quite aware - have, in fact, talked pub=
licly about - the problem of "spiked" chips making it into their =
supply chains.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Aha. =A0So, are there any case studies of this actually happening? =A0This =
might shed light on the RDRAND question. =A0If we had a documented case of =
(say) the Chinese slipping spiked chips in to one of the hot USAF toys, the=
n we'd have some sense of how likely this is.<div class=3D"im">
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
=A0 Then what?<br>
</blockquote>
Yet another arms race.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br></div>
Papers, conferences, budgets, hype, FUD, gosh.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font =
color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
<br>
iang</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>
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